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Rethinking Force Majeure in 
Public International Law 
 
by Myanna Dellinger* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Climate change is one of today’s most significant and 
complex problems.  The number and level of severity of 
extreme weather events is increasing rapidly around the 
world.1  One year after the next, we learn that heat records 
have been broken once again.2 Climate change has been traced 
 
 *After a successful first career in international communications and 
university instruction on two continents, Professor Dellinger graduated from 
law school at the top of her class at the University of Oregon School of Law 
(Order of the Coif).  Professor Dellinger is an Associate Professor of Law with 
the University of South Dakota School of Law where she teaches, among 
other things, Sales, Public International Law, International Business 
Transactions, and International Human Rights.  She researches and writes 
extensively on the intersection between international business and 
environmental law with a particular focus on climate change.  Professor 
Dellinger is also the Editor-in-Chief of the Contracts Prof Blog, where her 
blogs often address environmental issues that intersect with business.  She 
started and hosts the popular Global Energy and Environmental Law 
Podcast on iTunes.  Professor Dellinger is the Chair of the International 
Environmental Law section of the American Branch of the International Law 
Association.  She is a Fulbright Scholar and a peer reviewer for the National 
Science Foundation’s Law and Social Sciences Program.  She has visited 
thirty-six nations for business and pleasure.  Many thanks to Ashley Brost, 
J.D. Candidate 2017, the University of South Dakota School of Law, for her 
excellent research assistance.  
1.  See NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, EXTREME WEATHER (2014), 
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/report-findings/extreme-weather 
(discussing how severe weather and extreme climate events have increased 
over the last five decades).  
2.  See 2016 Climate Trends Continue to Break Records, NASA (July 19, 
2016), https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2016/climate-trends-continue-
to-break-records (stating “global surface temperatures . . . have broken 
numerous records through the first half of 2016”); Climate Council, 2016: 
Heat Record Broken Again, CLIMATE COUNCIL (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/2016-hottest-year-report (noting the global 
average temperature of 2016 was warmer than the previous temperature 
record set in 2015).  
1
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to a wide range of severe problems around the world, ranging 
from the obvious damage caused by hurricanes, floods, extreme 
rainfall, prolonged droughts, wildfires and a host of other 
weather-related issues to the perhaps less obvious such as 
physical and mental illnesses, “civil unrest, riots, mass 
migrations and perhaps wars caused by water and food 
shortages.”3  “It is no longer rationally debatable that climate 
change will take a huge toll on human health and prosperity as 
well as pose significant risks to national security if it is not 
curbed.”4 
Science has demonstrated that human activity is 
“extremely likely” to have contributed significantly to this 
increasingly volatile and problematic weather situation.5  At 
the same time, the developed nations that, to a very large 
extent, caused the climate change problem also clearly 
indicated in the negotiations leading up to the new Paris 
Agreement on climate change, as well as in the Agreement 
itself, that they are not willing to accept financial liability for 
any loss and damage caused by climate change.6  The matter is, 
at bottom, one of an alleged lack of sufficient resources and a 
similarly alleged inability to correctly apportion liability for the 
problem along with, of course, lack of political will to undertake 
legal responsibility for the financially severe consequences that 
are likely to arise because of climate change. 
However, financial liability for loss and damage caused by 
severe weather events may arise not only under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
regime, but also under established notions of customary 
international law such as the “no harm” rule, which creates a 
 
3.  Myanna Dellinger, An “Act of God”? Rethinking Contractual 
Impracticability in an Era of Anthropogenic Climate Change, 67 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1551, 1553 (2016). 
4.  Id.  
5.  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013: 
The Physical Science Basis, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 3, 17 (2013), 
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf 
[hereinafter IPCC I]. 
6.  See U.N. Paris Agreement art. 8, opened for signature Apr. 22, 2016 
(entered into force Nov. 4, 2016) [hereinafter U.N. Paris Agreement]; Wil 
Burns, Loss and Damage and the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 22 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 415 (2016) (citations omitted).   
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/2
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duty not to allow one’s territory to be used in ways that cause 
harm to other states.7  In this context, nation states may seek 
to avoid a finding of legal wrongfulness under the force 
majeure, necessity, or distress doctrines of law.  This article 
analyzes whether nations will be able to do so and critiques the 
arguments that are likely to arise in invoking these defenses.  
Many of the arguments that have traditionally been viable and 
that made legal (as well as practical) sense no longer do so 
given modern knowledge about climate change and its causes 
and effects. 
The article proceeds as follows: The history of the excuse 
doctrines that could and are applied in the context of “severe 
weather” will be briefly described to create a view of current 
law in the light of its development over time.  Similarly, the 
traditional legal distinction between “man” and “nature” will be 
examined as this differentiation, at worst, no longer makes 
sense in relation to climate change and, at best, is one without 
significance.  Because this article solely addresses the excuse 
doctrines that may apply to legal liability on nation states in 
the climate change context, the Paris Agreement on climate 
change (the “Agreement”) becomes relevant as it would have 
been fair and equitable to apportion loss and damage under 
this Agreement.  However, as the Agreement explicitly states 
that developed nations will not be liable for loss and damage 
under the treaty provisions,8 the article will proceed to analyze 
alternative theories of nation state responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts.  Finally, the article critiques the 
modern potential applicability of these doctrines for reasons of 
law and public policy. 
 
  
 
7.  See generally ‘No-Harm Rule’ and Climate Change, LEGAL RESPONSE 
INITIATIVE (July 24, 2012), http://legalresponseinitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/BP42E-Briefing-Paper-No-Harm-Rule-and-Climate-
Change-24-July-2012.pdf [hereinafter No-Harm Rule]. 
8.  Article 8 of the UNFCCC Paris Agreement states that the Agreement 
will “not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation” for loss 
and damage.  See U.N. Paris Agreement, supra note 6.  
3
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II. History of Weather-related Excuses 
 
In public international law, the doctrines of force majeure, 
necessity, and distress operate to preclude the legal 
wrongfulness of an act.9  The doctrines are invoked in the 
context of alleged “irresistible forces” or “unforeseen events” 
that the party or nation state in question could neither have 
prevented nor controlled.  Such events include climatic events 
such as hurricanes, heavy rain, windstorms, blizzards, and 
floods. 
“The majority of legal systems of the world have adopted 
rules concerning the consequences of the occurrence of 
irresistible, unforeseen or unforeseeable, or uncontrollable 
supervening events in the validity or performance of legal 
obligations.”10  The rules appear in “treaties, practice, case-law, 
and doctrinal commentary.”11  They are known by a variety of 
terms such as “force majeure, fortuitous event[s], impossibility, 
acts of God, unavoidable necessity, physical necessity, 
frustration, [and] impracticability.”12  Yet, all these notions 
cover the notion of what has often simply become known as 
“force majeure.”13 
The origin of force majeure can be traced to ancient Roman 
law.14  It then—as now—applied to the legal consequences of 
supervening events that had a demonstrable causal connection 
to injurious consequences.15  “In the following centuries, 
domestic legal systems would borrow from these notions to 
develop their own rules concerning allocation of risk in the 
view of the occurrence of supervening events.”16  Public 
international law came to realize that “the breach of 
international obligations [could be] justified or excused due to  
 
9.  ALINA KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 453 (5th 
ed. 2015).  
10.  Federica I. Paddeu, A Genealogy of Force Majeure in International 
Law, 82 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 381, 385 (2012).   
11.  Id.  
12.  Id. 
13.  Id. at 385-86. 
14.  Id. at 386. 
15.  Paddeu, supra note 10, at 386. 
16.  Id. at 386-87. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/2
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the occurrence of supervening events.”17  States have long been 
considered to have a natural law duty of self-preservation: 
 
‘[A] nation is bound to preserve itself’.  In view of 
this duty, the state ‘ought to avoid those things 
which can bring about its destruction’, but only 
insofar as it is in its power since ‘no one is bound 
to do the impossible’ . . . . ‘[T]hat which is to be 
imputed to bad fortune, and is not subject to our 
control, must be patiently endured and entrusted 
to divine providence’.  [But] [j]ust as it was 
impossible for a man ‘to resist a superior force’, 
so it was impossible for a state to ‘protect itself 
from destruction by a superior force’.  As 
examples of this superior force, [one writer] 
referred to earthquakes, extraordinary floods, 
‘the wrongful act of a stronger nation’ or internal 
struggles, famines or pestilences, all of which 
could bring about the destruction of the state.18 
 
In private law, the notion that what later became known 
as “acts of God” could work to provide a defense to liability that 
first appeared in English-language common law in 1581 in the 
famous English “Shelley’s Case,” where it was found that the 
death of a party to the contract made performance impossible.19  
The notion of an “act of God” evolved from the early (almost 
literal) construct to mean something beyond human agency and 
control, such as severe weather events.20  Courts sitting in torts 
found that, for reasons of fairness, parties should not be found 
negligent for failing to prevent the negative effects of events 
which they could neither reasonably have foreseen nor 
prevented.21  This “act of God” doctrine worked its way beyond 
torts law into admiralty, private national and international 
 
 
 17.  Id. at 393. 
18.  Id. at 401 (citations omitted).  
19.  Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1565. 
20.  Id. at 1601. 
21.  Id.  
5
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contracts law, and environmental law in English-speaking 
countries.22 
Today, the doctrine of force majeure is very relevant to a 
range of different situations facing nation states.  For example, 
it has been applied to the question of the suspension and 
continued validity of treaties: “[I]f the state that has promised 
succours finds herself unable to furnish them, her inability 
alone is sufficient to dispense with the obligation; and if she 
cannot give her assistance without exposing herself to evident 
danger, this circumstance also dispenses with it.”23  This raises 
the question of whether nation states may use the doctrine to 
avoid treaty obligations or seek retreat from the UNFCCC 
and/or the Paris Agreement because of problems caused by 
climate change while, at the same time, having contributed to 
the problem as all nation states have.  This could be the topic of 
further research, but is outside the scope of this article. 
“The most commonly quoted example [of the idea] was that 
of an irresistible force,” which may preclude the legal 
wrongfulness of a natural force, such as a storm, forcing a 
vessel to enter a foreign, but closed, port.24  Under such 
circumstances, the “vessel [is] not subject to the consequences 
of [the] entry.”25  Force majeure also allows “innocent passage 
through neutral waters to a belligerent vessel during war.”26  
Under the law of war, “blockades could be affected by force 
majeure in numerous ways.”27  Neutral vessels may enter a 
“blockaded port without breach of the blockade making it liable 
to capture in cases of force majeure.”28  Tsunamis may “damage 
a nuclear plant, rendering it impossible for [a] state . . . to 
provide energy to a neighbouring state.”29  Hunger so severe 
may arise from continued droughts that nations with 
populations at risk of famine may fail to perform international 
obligations to deliver crops to other nations, preferring instead 
 
22.  Id. at 1567. 
23.  Paddeu, supra note 10, at 403 (citing MONSIEUR DE VATTEL, LAW OF 
NATIONS § 92 (1883)).  
24.  Id. at 405. 
25.  Id. (citations omitted).  
26.  Id. at 406 (citations omitted).  
27.  Id. at 407. 
28.  Paddeu, supra note 10, at 407 (citations omitted).  
29.  Id. at 463. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/2
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to feed its own obligations.30  In these and other situations, 
nation states may invoke the excuse doctrines to prevent a 
finding of legal wrongfulness on their parts.  However, as will 
be demonstrated below, they may still be held legally liable for 
the financial consequences of their actions or non-actions, 
although these were not legally wrongful.  This is a significant 
differentiation and concern in the context of climate change 
with the recognized risks of costly consequences to both public 
and private entities around the world. 
 
III. “Man v. Nature” Distinction 
 
The notion that some events are beyond the control of 
humankind runs beneath the excuse doctrines in both public 
and private law.  But from where does this notion stem? 
Humankind has, for a long time, distinguished between 
what may be considered to be acts of “God” or “nature” on one 
side, or “man” on the other.  “We still distinguish between what 
is ‘man-made’ and what is ‘natural’ in many contexts.”31  “We 
think we ‘react’ to – or adapt to - natural events rather than 
‘create’ them”32 even in spite of today’s clear scientific 
knowledge that we are greatly affecting our natural 
environment.  We tend to see ourselves as separate and almost 
untouchable entities somewhat removed from and superior to 
the natural world we inhibit.33  This is a “viewpoint that is 
becoming archaic and that is challenged to an increasing, 
although still somewhat controversial, extent.”34  “Our 
thoughts about what ‘nature’ is and is not generate 
consequences for humankind and for our environment”35 via 
the laws and policies we create and thus the action or inaction 
in relation to such issues as climate change. 
The law still encompasses these views to a very large 
extent.  For example, United States food labeling requirements 
and practices distinguish between such notions as “manmade,” 
 
30.  Id. 
31.  See Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1568. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. at 1567. 
34.  Id. at 1568. 
35.  Id.  
7
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“natural,” “organic,” “processed,” or “unprocessed.”36  Drug and 
cosmetics labeling similarly differentiate between the natural 
and the man-made.  Arguably, this makes little sense given the 
fact that all marketed food products require some form of 
human participation.  “Separation of the human and the 
‘natural’ is increasingly being recognized in this context as 
more of a [continuum than a sharp] division . . . .”37 
“Public land use law in the United States is also marked by 
a significant debate about what is ‘natural’ and what is 
‘human.’”38  The Wilderness Act, for example, made early use of 
such attempts at differentiating man from nature as classifying 
whether an area was “untrammeled by man.’”39  “The 
Wilderness Act defined the purpose of wilderness not in terms 
of any inherent value, but in terms of its value as a ‘resource’ 
for human use, enjoyment, and consumption.”40  The legal 
differentiation between human entities as natural entities and 
the rest of nature remains clear, albeit arguably no longer 
logical given our severe interference with our natural 
environment. 
At bottom, many of the events that have the greatest 
impacts on us today can be traced to human action or 
inaction.41  We cannot continue blaming nature for all the 
consequences of our actions that we currently witness.  “We are 
simply not separate from nature; we are an integral 
physiological part of it.  Just as nature has an effect on us, so 
do we have a clear effect on it.”42  In few other contexts does 
this have a clearer practical impact than when it comes to 
climate change.  Continuing to ascribe “extreme” weather 
events to “nature” or “God” makes little sense given today’s 
readily available knowledge about the scientific causes and 
 
36.  Jill M. Fraley, Re-Examining Acts of God, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
669, 681-82 (2010). 
37.  Id. at 682. 
38.  Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1569.  See also id.; Sean Kammer, 
Coming to Terms with Wilderness: The Wilderness Act and the Problem of 
Wildlife Restoration, 43 ENVTL. L. 83, 109 (2013). 
39.  Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1569; Fraley, supra note 36, at 682. 
40.  Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1569 (citing National Wilderness 
Preservation System, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012)). 
41.  Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1569.  
42.  Id.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/2
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effects of climate change: IPCC scientists are 95 to 100% 
certain that the cause is human activity.43  The law relating to 
defenses based on weather calamities ought to reflect modern 
factual reality.  “[A]s our understanding of our natural 
surroundings improves,”44 so should the law and its judicial 
applications.  “For example, where underground water flows 
were once also seen as ‘mysterious’ and inexplicable 
phenomena, science has now documented how and where water 
flows.  Water law changed with this understanding.”45  So 
should the law in relation to climate change loss and damage. 
Time has now come to rethink the ability of nation states, 
as well as private parties, to avoid financial liability based on 
weather events that were once successfully argued to be 
unpreventable and unforeseeable by the parties.  “Extreme” 
weather events are no longer so; they are becoming the order of 
the day.  “[L]aw is itself a human construct.”46  Excuse 
doctrines based on unwarranted perceptions that we have not 
and cannot affect the weather must be reconstructed to reflect 
modern on-the-ground reality.  The law is often considered to 
adapt too slowly to the realities of modern life, such as in the 
technical areas and, here, the scientific and meteorological.  At 
the same time, the general public is losing faith in the 
judiciary’s ability to progressively solve some of today’s most 
urgent societal problems.47  If willing to reinterpret those parts 
of the weather-related excuse doctrines that are left to the 
discretion of the courts, judges would be able to regain some of 
that faith.  Doing so may arguably also act as impetus for 
legislatures around the world to review the unfortunate 
inaction and unwillingness to take the regulatory action that is 
so urgently needed to stem the super-wicked problem of climate 
change.  Needless to say, the codifications of such concepts of 
force majeure, necessity, and distress ought similarly to take 
changing weather realities and the effects thereof on legal 
liability into account. 
 
 
43.  IPCC I, supra note 5, at 4, n.1, 17.  
44.  Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1570.  
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. at 1569.  
47.  Id. at 1591. 
9
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IV. Liability for Loss and Damage under the Paris 
Agreement 
 
Climate change has long been recognized to present the 
risk of costly adverse consequences on both private and public 
funds.  These include “an array of potential economic impacts, 
such as damage to infrastructure from coastal erosion and 
flooding, declines in crop production, or loss of fisheries.”48  
Moreover, climate change poses a very real risk of “non-
economic damages, such as loss of biodiversity and ecosystem 
services, loss of culture and sovereignty, and decline of 
indigenous knowledge.”49 
These risks are not insignificant.  In fact, climate change 
may manifest itself in impacts of a potentially “inconceivable 
magnitude.”50  Although there has been very little detailed 
research to date to quantify potential loss and damage costs 
over this century and beyond, the estimates that have been 
made are truly daunting.  For example, the UNFCCC has 
found that it could cost about “USD 70-100 billion per year by 
2030 to deal with the worst impacts of climate change.”51  
Others estimate the true annual cost to reach USD 300 billion 
or more.52  A recent study by the non-governmental 
organization Action Aid pegged the mean cost of climate 
change impacts at $275 trillion between 2000 and 2200.53  The 
 
48.  Burns, supra note 6, at 418. 
49.  Id. 
50.  Framing the Loss and Damage debate: A conversation starter by the 
Loss and Damage Vulnerable Countries Initiative, LOSS & DAMAGE, Aug. 
2012, at 1, 3, https://www.germanwatch.org/fr/download/6673.pdf [hereinafter 
Framing].  See also Ainun Nishat et al., A Range of Approaches to Address 
Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts in Bangladesh, LOSS & 
DAMAGE, June 2013, at 1, 24, http://www.loss-and-damage.net/download/ 
7069.pdf.  
51.  No-harm Rule, supra note 7, at 3.  See also Investment and 
Financial Flows to Address Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/financial_flows.pdf. 
52.  See Martin Parry et al., Assessing the Costs of Adaptation to Climate 
Change: A Review of the UNFCCC and Other Recent Estimates, INT’L INST. 
FOR ENV’T & DEV, Aug. 2009, at 1, http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/11501IIED.pdf. 
53.  Lies Craeynest, Loss and damage from climate change: the cost for 
poor people in developing countries, ACT!ONAID, Nov. 2010, at 1, 11, 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/2
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African Climate Policy Center of the United National Economic 
Commission for Africa’s assessment of potential loss and 
damage on the continent concluded that these impacts could 
reduce GDP in many sectors between 1% (in a “2°C World”) up 
to 5% (in a “4+°C World).”54  Of course, losses are not only 
monetary in nature, but may well take on life and death 
consequences as well.  “A report of the Global Humanitarian 
Forum estimated that climate change already causes 300,000 
deaths per year throughout the world and seriously impacts 
the lives of 325 million people.”55 
This sobering reality has led to increasing focus on the 
concept that has become known as “loss and damage.”56  While 
the term “loss and damage” is not defined under the UNFCCC 
or other legal instruments, a generally recognized definition is 
“those impacts of climate change that will neither be mitigated, 
nor adapted to.”57  Burns has stated: 
 
In this context, ‘loss’ is construed as 
‘irrecoverable negative impacts,’ such as loss of 
freshwater resources or culture or heritage, while 
‘damage’ are climatic manifestations from which 
 
http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/loss_and_damage_-
_discussion_paper_by_actionaid-_nov_2010.pdf.   
54.  Michiel Schaeffer et.al, Loss and Damage in Africa, U.N. ECON. 
COMM’N FOR AFR., May 2014, at 1, 17, 
http://www.uncclearn.org/sites/default/files/inventory/uneca32.pdf.  
55. No-harm Rule, supra note 7, at 3.  See also GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN 
FORUM, HUMAN IMPACT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE – THE ANATOMY OF A SILENT 
CRISIS 1, 1 (2009), 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/9668_humanimpactreport1.pdf. 
56.  See generally Burns, supra note 6.  
57.  Mizan R. Khan et al., Assessing Microinsurance as a Tool to Address 
Loss and Damage in the National Context of Bangladesh, LOSS & DAMAGE, 
June 2013, at 1, 9, http://loss-and-damage.net/download/7078.pdf.  See also 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 1, 1 (2014), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/ar5_wgII_spm_en.pdf 
(stating that residual loss and damage will occur from climate change despite 
mitigation and adaptation action); Urmi Goswami, UN Climate Change 
Negotiations 2012: Developing and developed countries divided on ‘loss and 
damage’, ECON. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2012, 6:26 AM), 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/un-climate-change-
negotiations-2012-developing-and-developed-countries-divided-on-loss-and-
damage/articleshow/17528764.cms. 
11
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ecosystems and human institutions can recover, 
such as impacts on infrastructure related to 
violent weather events or damage to mangroves 
from coastal surges.58 
 
In short, climate change will have severe financial and 
other impacts on nations and their constituents in the years to 
come. 
Perhaps precisely because of the sheer potential 
magnitude of the problem of climate change, developed nations 
have, so far, no matter how inequitably this may appear, 
refused to accept any legally binding loss and damage 
provisions under the Paris Agreement.  Ultimately, the parties 
to the UNFCCC opted not to establish a discrete loss and 
damage mechanism under the Agreement, but rather to make 
the existing loss and damage provision under the Warsaw 
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (“WIM”) 
“subject to the authority and guidance of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to [the Paris] 
Agreement” (“CMP”).59  In other words, the WIM is still 
applicable under the Paris Agreement in spite of the years 
since its adoption. 
Whereas the WIM “may be enhanced and strengthened,”60 
the Decision of the Parties (“Decision”) also expressly and 
indicatively provides that the loss and damage provision of the 
Agreement – Article 8 - will “not involve or provide a basis for 
any liability or compensation.”61  “This provision was critical 
for engendering support by developed countries, who for the 
most part opposed [the] creation of potential legal remedies for 
climatic impacts,”62 whereas “[m]any developing countries 
fought to include a loss and damage provision in the Paris 
Agreement, believing that this would increase the issue’s 
 
58.  Burns, supra note 6, at 417. 
59.  U.N. Paris Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 8.   
60.  Id.  
61.  U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 
November to 11 December 2015, 51 U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 
12, 2015) [hereinafter Report of the Conference]. 
62.  Burns, supra note 6, at 425. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/2
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saliency in the years to come . . . .”63  Some doubt remains as to 
the legal status of the Decision, which may thus not preclude 
action for liability.  On the other hand, the Decision remains 
important for interpreting Article 8 of the Agreement.  It 
speaks in no uncertain terms about the Parties’ intended 
effects of the Agreement on loss and damage liability, namely 
to not create “any.”  Should it come to any legal action against 
nations for loss and damage in the climate change context, this 
could be highly determinative despite quibbles regarding the 
exact legal effects of one instrument versus the other. 
Having said that, it should also be noted that some 
nations, such as Micronesia, renounced the attempts by 
otherwise potentially liable nations to reject liability as follows: 
 
The Government of the Federated States of 
Micronesia declares its understanding that its 
ratification of the Paris Agreement does not 
constitute a renunciation of any rights of the 
Government of the Federated States of 
Micronesia under international law concerning 
State responsibility for the adverse effects of 
climate change, and that no provision in the 
Paris Agreement can be interpreted as 
derogating from principles of general 
international law or any claims or rights 
concerning compensation and liability due to the 
adverse effects of climate change.64 
 
This was likely done in order to, and may have the effect 
of, preserving Micronesia’s legal rights to claim liability for loss 
and damage under the “no harm” principles stemming from, 
among other things, the Trail Smelter decision analyzed 
further below. 
Whereas the preamble to the Paris Agreement mentions 
such laudable intentions as “the principle of equity and 
common but differentiated responsibility” and “the specific 
 
63.  Id. at 424.  
64.  U.N. Paris Agreement Micronesia Ratification, opened for signature 
Apr. 22, 2016 (entered into force Nov. 4, 2016). 
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needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, 
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change,”65 the preamble is not legally binding 
and thus has little, if any, legal effect.  In combination with the 
parties specifically renouncing the legal liabilities for 
financially adverse consequences of climate change on each 
other’s territories in the COP Decision, it is fair to say the 
Paris Agreement did not bring more hope in the treaty context 
as regards financial liability. 
Thus, the most relevant provision to loss and damage 
under the UNFCCC umbrella is still the WIM.  This was 
established to address climate change-associated loss and 
damage, both in terms of extreme weather and slow-onset 
events in vulnerable developing countries.66  The WIM is 
tasked with three primary functions, reflecting both functional 
modes of action (action approaches) and systemic modes of 
actions (signaling areas of concern):67 
 
1. “Enhancing knowledge and understanding 
of comprehensive risk management approaches 
to address loss and damage.” Methods to 
facilitate this will include seeking to address 
gaps in knowledge and expertise to address loss 
and damage, collection, sharing, management 
and use of relevant data and information and a 
collation of best practices, challenges and lessons 
learned; 
2. “Strengthening dialogue, coordination, 
coherence and synergies among relevant 
stakeholders.” This function is to be effectuated 
by spearheading and coordinating assessment 
and implementation of approaches to address 
loss and damage, and to foster dialogue, 
coordination and synergies among pertinent 
 
65.  U.N. Paris Agreement, supra note 6, at preamble.  
66.  Report of the Conference, supra note 61, at art. 8, ¶ 1.  
67.  Laura Schäfer & Sönke Kreft, Loss and Damage: Roadmap to 
Relevance for the Warsaw International Mechanism, GERMANWATCH & BROT 
FÜR DIE WELT, Mar. 2014, at 1, 9-10, 
https://germanwatch.org/en/download/9002.pdf. 
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stakeholders, institutions and key processes and 
initiatives; 
3. “Enhancing action and support, including 
finance, technology and capacity building.” This 
should include providing technical support and 
guidance to those seeking to address loss and 
damage, information and recommendations to 
the Conference of the Parties on how to reduce 
risks and manifestations of loss and damage, and 
efforts to mobilize expertise, financial support, 
technology and capacity-building.68 
 
However, none of these “soft law” provisions are likely to 
be able to result in any one nation or region (e.g., the EU) being 
held legally liable for the climate change-related loss and 
damage incurred by other nations.  In addition to the problem 
presented by the vagueness of the WIM provisions, the problem 
of traceability between one arguably culpable nation or group 
of nations and the asserted victim nation remains difficult, as 
will be analyzed further below, but also presents an obstacle to 
nation state liability for loss and damage caused by climate 
change.  In short, it is, at best, questionable how effective the 
WIM will be in assisting nations seeking to hold other nations 
financially liable for loss and damage. 
The Paris Agreement does, however: 
 
[S]et[] forth a number of potential areas for 
facilitation and cooperation in the context of loss 
and damage, including establishment of early 
warning systems, emergency preparedness, 
responses to slow onset and irreversible events, 
comprehensive risk assessment and 
management, establishment of risk insurance 
facilities, addressing of non-economic losses, and 
strategies to enhance resilience of human 
institutions and ecosystems.69 
 
 
68.  Burns, supra note 6, at 422. 
69.  Id. at 425. 
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“The Parties also requested that the WIM Executive 
Committee establish an information clearinghouse for 
insurance and risk transfer mechanisms, as well as a task force 
to address climate-related population displacement.”70  
“Finally, the Agreement authorized the CMP to enhance and 
strengthen the WIM in the future.”71 
In short, legal liability for loss and damage caused by 
climate change is, on balance, unlikely to arise under the 
WIM/UNFCCC regime.  The provisions therein are simply too 
vague when it comes to a potential finding of liability and, at 
the same time, sufficiently clear when it comes to the 
renunciation of it.  The battle was arguably lost before and 
during the Paris Agreement negotiations.  Thus, nation states 
looking to hold other nations responsible for climate change-
induced financial losses will have to look to other legal venues.  
This includes taking a renewed look at the generalized 
provisions of international law including customary 
international law.  These will be analyzed next. 
 
V. State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts 
 
“Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the 
international responsibility of that State.”72  Nation states may 
thus be liable to each other for both direct and indirect legal 
wrongs.  “A direct wrong arises when one State is in direct 
breach of an obligation owed to another State, e.g. the breach of 
a treaty” of which both parties are members or the breach of a 
customary obligation.73  Indirect liability arises where a state is 
in breach of a duty owed to the national of another state, rather 
than the state itself.74 
Two further bases for state responsibility exist: the “risk” 
or “objective” theory of responsibility and the “fault” or 
 
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. 
72.  U.N. International Law Commission, Draft articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, art. 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter DARSIWA]. 
73.  KACZOROKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 450, 459. 
74.  Id. at 450. 
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“subjective” theory of responsibility.75  Under the objective 
theory, a nation may be held liable for both the acts of the 
officials or organs of the state, even in the absence of any 
“fault” of its own.76  The Caire Claim (France v. Mexico) 
exemplifies this approach: Caire, a French national, was 
tortured and killed in Mexico by Mexican soldiers in a failed 
ransom attempt.77  In applying the doctrine of objective 
responsibility and holding Mexico liable, the President of the 
Claims Commission explained that: 
 
[T]he doctrine of “objective responsibility” . . . 
may devolve upon [the nation state] even in the 
absence of any “fault” of its own . . . The state 
also bears an international responsibility for all 
acts committed by its officials or its organs which 
are delictual according to international law, 
regardless of whether the official organ has acted 
within the limits of its competence . . . 
However, . . . it is necessary that [the officials or 
organs] should have acted . . . or that, in acting, 
they should have used powers or measures 
appropriate to their official character.”78 
 
As regards the way nation states should have acted, they 
arguably should have taken (and still should take) greater 
steps to alleviate climate change under their duty not to 
knowingly allow their territories to be used for acts contrary to 
the rights of other States,79 as will be analyzed next. 
The doctrine of objective responsibility appears to have 
somewhat wider support than that of subjective 
 
75.  Id. at 457. 
76.  Id. 
77.  Estate of Jean-Baptiste Caire (Fr.) v. United Mexican States, 5 
R.I.A.A. 516, 529-531 (1929). 
78.  The Basis and Nature of State Responsibility, CHEGE KIBATHI & CO: 
LAW LEARNERS (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.ckadvocates.co.ke/2013/12/the-
basis-and-nature-of-state-responsibility/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).  
79.  See The Corfu Channel Case (U. K. v. Alb,), Judgment, I.C.J. 4, 22 
(1948); Trail Smelter Case (U. S. v. Can.), 3 U.N. REP. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 
1905 (1941) [hereinafter Trail Smelter Case].  
17
 472 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:2 
responsibility.80  However, scholars have also “argued that to 
see State responsibility exclusively in the light of either 
approach is misleading.”81  The better view is that the “content 
of a particular duty—will depend not upon a general principle 
but upon the precise formulation of each obligation of 
international law.”82 
Accordingly, without applying the subjective/objective 
differentiation, established principles of international law hold 
that every internationally wrongful act is an act or omission on 
the part of a State which 1) “is attributable to the State under 
international law” and 2) “constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of the State.”83 
Decades ago, the Trail Smelter arbitration case famously 
established the now broadly accepted view that nation states 
may be held liable for damages caused by pollution emanating 
from facilities in one nation and harming a neighboring state, 
even where the facilities at issue are privately owned and thus 
arguably not directly attributable to the nation from which the 
pollution stems.84  In the case, the United States sued Canada 
for violating American sovereignty by allowing Canadian 
territory to be used in a manner that caused severe pollution in 
the United States.85  At bottom, the case arose as follows: 
during the early 20th century, the Canadian zinc and lead 
smelting company Cominco was operating in Trail, British 
Columbia, a few miles from the American border.86  This 
industrial process emitted sulfur dioxide causing injury to 
plant life, forest trees, soil, and crop yields in Washington 
 
80. KACZOROKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 459. 
81. Id. 
82. IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY, PART 1 40 (1983). 
83.  DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 1, 2. 
84.  See generally Trail Smelter Case, supra note 79. 
85.  Id. at 1912-13.  
86. Id. at 1913; see Dene Moore, U.S. Ruling Over Teck’s Rail, B.C. 
Smelter May Have Ripple Effect, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Dec. 16, 2012, 4:08 
PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/the-
law-page/us-ruling-over-tecks-rail-bc-smelter-may-have-ripple-
effect/article6459408/ (“[C]omplaints about the contamination from the Trail 
smelter surfaced as early as the 1940s, when farmers from Washington state 
sued Cominco . . . over air pollution from the smelter.”).  
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State.87  American farmers claimed damages from the waste 
emitted by the smelter.88  After several rounds of failed 
negotiations, the United States charged Canada for these 
injuries.89 The case was referred to the International Joint 
Commission, a bilateral tribunal overseeing issues regarding 
the two countries.90  The tribunal held that it is the 
responsibility of a State to protect other states against harmful 
act by individuals from within its jurisdiction at all times: 
 
[U]nder the principles of international law, as 
well as of the law of the United States, no State 
has the right to use or permit the use of its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by 
fumes in or to the territory of another or the 
properties or persons therein, when the case is of 
serious consequence and the injury is established 
by clear and convincing evidence.91 
 
Canada eventually accepted responsibility for the actions 
of the smelting plant.92  As a result, Canada was forced to pay 
for COMINICO’s past pollution instead of it “conflict resolution 
put the onus on Canada to compensate for COMINCO’s past 
pollution rather than forcing COMINICO to prevent future 
harm to U.S. soil.”93  In addition to the duty not to knowingly 
allow a national territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other states (the “transboundary harm principle”), the 
legacy of this decision also came to include the polluter-pays 
principle as well as the duty to establish regulatory regimes to 
 
87.  See Catherine Prunella, An International Environmental Law Case 
Study: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL POLLUTION ISSUES (Dec. 
2014), https://intipollution.commons.gc.cuny.edu/an-international-
environmental-law-case-study-the-trail-smelter-arbitration/ (“Sulfur dioxide 
and particulate matter from the metals were the constituents of the smelter 
smoke produced at Trail.”). 
88.  Trail Smelter Case, supra note 79, at 1917. 
89.  Id. at 1907.  
90.  Id. at 1918. 
91.  Id. at 1965. 
92.  See id. at 1933 (stating “the Dominion of Canada has completely 
fulfilled all obligation with respect to the payment [of past damages]”). 
93. See supra notes 80, 89.  
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prevent environmental degradation, which, in turn, allow 
nations to take positive steps to control pollution.  The failure 
by states to meet these responsibilities may mean that they are 
breaching international law. 
“Subsequently, the no-harm rule has been incorporated in 
various law and policy documents.”94  For example, Principle 21 
of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration provides that: 
 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.95 
 
Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, Article 3 of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, and the preamble of the UNFCCC repeat Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Declaration almost verbatim.96  Article 194 
paragraph 2 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) mention the doctrine that “[s]tates 
 
94.  No-harm Rule, supra note 7, at 1.  
95.  U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 5-16, 1972). 
96.  U.N. Conference on Environment & Development, Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, Principle 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 
(Vol. 1) (Aug. 12, 1992); U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for 
signature June 5, 1992, art. 3 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993); U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Preamble, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/INFORMAL/84 (1992).  See also U.N. Convention on the Law of the 
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, opened for signature 
May 21, 1997 (entered into force Aug. 17, 2014); U.N. Conference on Trade 
and Development, International Tropical Timber Agreement, U.N. Doc. 
TD/TIMBER.3/12 (Feb. 1, 2006); U.N. Convention, The Stockholm Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, opened for signature on May 22, 2001, U.N. 
Doc. UNEP/POPS/CONF/4, App. II (2001) (entered into force May 17, 2004); 
U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing 
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Final Text of the Convention, U.N. 
Doc. A/AC.241/27 (Sept. 12, 1994). 
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shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities 
under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to 
cause damage by pollution to other States and their 
environment . . . .”97 
“While it has been questioned whether the no-harm rule is 
adequately reflected in actual state practice to represent 
customary international law, its existence has been 
authoritatively confirmed by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ).”:98 
 
In the advisory opinion on the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons, the ICJ explicitly stated that 
“[t]he existence of the general obligation of states 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction 
and control respect the environment of other 
states or of areas beyond national control is now 
part of the corpus of international law relating to 
the environment”.99 
 
“The Court repeated these findings in the case concerning 
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam (Hungary v. Slovakia)100 and 
most recently in the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay).”101 
“The Trail Smelter arbitration is widely accepted as the 
[foundational basis] for the development of the no-harm rule.102  
 
97.  U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 
10, 1982, art. 194(2) (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). 
98.  No-harm Rule, supra note 7, at 2. 
99.  Id.  
100.  Id. 
101.  Id.  According to the Legal Responsive Initiative: 
 
The latter judgment states that ‘[a] State is thus obliged to 
use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities 
which take place in its territory, or in any area under its 
jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment 
of another State.’ Id.  In this connection, the ICJ refers to 
the no- harm rule as the ‘principle of prevention’ and points 
out that as a customary rule it has its origins in the due 
diligence that is required of a State in its territory.  
Id. 
102.  Id.  
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However, “while the case only dealt with transboundary harm 
to other (neighbouring) [sic] states, the Stockholm principles 
and other subsequent international agreements also include, 
[more broadly], the global commons.”103  “States are under an 
obligation to protect the environment of other states and in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction from damage caused by 
activities on their territory.”104  This notion is not limited to 
neighboring states.  For example, in a case between Argentina 
v. Uruguay, the ICJ stated that “[a] State is [] obliged to use all 
the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take 
place in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, 
causing significant damage to the environment of another 
State.”105  Article 2(c) of the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities also defines “transboundary harm” as 
“harm caused in the territory of” another state “whether or not 
the States concerned share a common border.”106 
The 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts provide for two situations in 
which a state may be responsible for unlawful acts committed 
by private persons namely, under Article 8: 1) when their 
conduct is “directed or controlled by a State”107 or, 2) under 
Article 11, when their conduct is “acknowledged and adopted 
by a State.”108 
Further, Section 601 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law provides that: 
 
A state is obligated to take such measures as 
may be necessary, to the extent practicable 
under the circumstances, to ensure that 
activities within its jurisdiction or control . . . are 
conducted so as not to cause significant injury to 
 
103.  No-harm Rule, supra note 7, at 2. 
104.  Id. (emphasis added). 
105.  Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 
I.C.J. at 56, ¶ 101 (Apr. 2010). 
106.  U.N. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Prevention 
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with commentaries, art. 
2(c), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). 
107.  DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 8. 
108.  Id. at art. 11. 
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the environment of another state or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.109 
 
Finally, the preamble to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change clearly states that that “[s]tates 
have . . . the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental and developmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.”110  These provisions clearly make the “no 
harm” principle applicable in the climate change context: 
 
[T]here is a general consensus that 
transboundary interference must be “of serious 
consequence” and cause at least “significant”, 
“substantial” or “appreciable” harm.  Minimal, 
trivial or simply detectable impacts do not meet 
that threshold.  A detrimental effect on matters 
such as human health, property or agriculture 
broadly measurable in monetary terms is 
required to trigger the application of the no harm 
rule.”111 
 
Nation states may thus, as a starting point, be held liable 
for damage to the territory of another nation.  This is, in 
general, a no fault rule112: 
 
The notion of fault or culpa is particularly 
inappropriate in respect of State responsibility 
for wrongful acts because: it requires the 
discovery of the intentions or motives of a 
wrongful act; and it misunderstands the main 
 
109.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 601 (1)(b) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1987). 
110.  U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Preamble, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/INFORMAL/84 (1992). 
111.  No-harm Rule, supra note 7.  
112.  DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 1, 2; KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, 
supra note 9, at 459. 
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purpose of imposing responsibility on a State 
which is to restore the equality of states vis-à-vis 
their international obligations which has been 
disturbed by the commission of a wrongful act.113 
 
The lack of fault may nonetheless still be invoked in some 
cases for some limited purposes.  For example, the lack of fault 
may be invoked as an element of particular excuse doctrines 
and thus preclude state responsibility in certain circumstances 
as will be analyzed further below.  Fault is also taken into 
account in the determination of compensation.114  A state may 
be held liable where, for example, “it has knowledge of the 
circumstances of a wrongful act of another state and 
notwithstanding this provides aid and assistance to that 
state”115 or “directs and controls another State in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act.”116 
A few examples of nations being held responsible for acts 
damaging other nations’ territories despite the lack of fault 
serve to illuminate the doctrine.  When NATO forces led by the 
United States mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade, the United States paid damages despite the fact that 
no culpability or fault was at issue.117  Similarly, China paid 
damages to the United States for mob damage to the United 
States diplomatic mission in China during demonstrations 
subsequent to the just mentioned bombing.118 
As for compensation, a liable nation state must make “full 
reparation for the injury caused by the commission of the 
internationally wrongful act.”119  This “may take the form of 
restitution, compensation or satisfaction, either separately or 
in combination.”120 
Although climate change poses a typical tragedy-of-the-
commons style problem caused by a multitude of nation state 
 
113.  KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 459. 
114.  Id. 
115.  DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 16. 
116.  Id. at art. 17. 
117.  KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 469. 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id. at 453. 
120.  Id. 
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and private actors and is not solvable by any one particular 
actor or nation state, it has become increasingly implausible for 
at least some nation states to continue to argue that they have 
not “caused” or been at “fault” for causing the problem.  This 
particularly apples to the historically and currently major CO2 
emitters such as the USA, EU, China, and India.  Clearly, 
these and other nations have contributed very significantly to 
the substantive problem because of decades of regulatory 
inaction and, in the case of some, downright denial of 
responsibility for the underlying problem, if not even the very 
existence of the problem itself.  This weighs in favor of finding 
that they can indeed be faulted for the problem caused in such 
large part by these nations.  The counter-argument in this 
context is typically that of causation, namely that so long as a 
problem is not sufficiently attributable to one particular actor, 
that actor should not bear the legal and financial consequences 
of the problem.  In other words, the problem remains the 
traceability between the polluting activities in each individual 
nation and the overall problem.  However, with modern 
scientific knowledge, each nation’s historic and current share of 
the problem has become known to a sufficiently specific extent 
so that liability could, for example, be attributed on a pro-rata 
basis reflecting historical CO2 emissions until a certain year 
and, thereafter, current emissions.  Nation states clearly have 
knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongfulness of not 
curbing climate change.  The fact that many still stall in taking 
action in this regard is either irrelevant to the liability 
argument or adds to the justifiability of holding them liable. 
As a starting point, the standard of liability is, as 
mentioned, a no-fault standard.121  Thus, even if a nation state 
claims – and, granted, arguably correctly so – that it did not 
cause climate change since a multitude of actors did, it suffices 
that the particular nation should have acted by taking 
appropriate measures against this problem as its causes and 
effects became known.  It has become reckless for nation states 
to continue to ignore a problem of this national and 
international severity knowing full well how at least some 
action – regulatory and otherwise - could have been and still 
 
121.  See DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 1, 2; KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, 
supra note 9, at 459. 
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can be taken against it by at least developed nations.  Under 
Trail Smelter and its progeny, nation states are in violation of 
the law where they allow their territories to be used in ways 
that cause damage to other nations.  Further, “the legal 
literature increasingly describes the principle of prevention as 
emanating from the concept of due diligence – a standard of 
care [attributable to] government authorities.”122  Thus, despite 
the foreseeability of events or lack thereof, proportionate 
measures which were capable of protecting the environment 
were and are often not taken.  A state may thus be considered 
careless and potentially liable for the resulting harm. 
When the injurious action is “controlled” by a state, as is 
the case with most CO2-creating activities in developed nations 
around the world, nations may be held liable.  In addition to 
the lack of sufficient regulatory action, nation states still 
provide aid and assistance to other states with the knowledge 
that the recipient states continue activities that add to the 
climate change problem.  Although it is, of course, sound 
international policy to provide aid and assistance to other 
states, the time may well have come to more closely earmark 
such assistance to activities that do not further contribute to 
climate change.  For equitable reasons, the donor states should 
then arguably also step up their own climate change-curbing 
action so as to not demand more from others than what 
developed nations themselves do, but that is the direction 
developments in this context need to go anyway. 
In short, if developed nations continue to delay or refuse 
taking effective steps to curb climate change, they may, under 
customary international law and international legal principles, 
albeit not the UNFCCC Paris Agreement, incur legal liability 
under the no-harm rule.  This problem is becoming more and 
more relevant as the number and severity of climate change-
induced severe weather events increase.  The financial risks 
caused by climate change are significant.  This is, of course, 
precisely why developed nations, who to a very large degree 
caused the underlying problem in the first place, now seek to 
avoid financial liability.  If, however, liability actions are 
 
122.  No-harm Rule, supra note 7, at 5.  See PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN 
BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 
143-52, 453 (3d ed. 2009). 
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brought against them, they are likely to invoke one or more of 
the excuse doctrines addressed next. 
 
VI. Excuse for the International Wrongness of State 
Acts 
 
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that the 
following “exculpatory defenses preclude the [legal] 
wrongfulness of an act, but not necessarily the responsibility of 
the perpetrating State.123  The matter of whether, in a situation 
where a State takes action that causes injury to another State 
or its nationals, but the action is not unlawful, that State will 
still be under an obligation to pay compensation is addressed in 
Article 27 of the DARSIWA: “The invocation of a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness . . . is without prejudice to . . . the 
question of compensation for any material loss caused by the 
act in question.”124  Importantly, thus, is 
 
[t]he fact that an act of State is lawful will not 
necessarily mean that the respondent State will 
have no duty to pay compensation.  In particular, 
in a situation of distress or necessity there is no 
reason why a State, which acts for its own 
benefit, should not pay compensation for any 
material harm or loss caused by its act.125 
 
Nonetheless, states would, in all likelihood, first attempt to 
seek a determination that their allegedly wrongful acts were 
not so from a legal standpoint.  This could make their case 
against liability stronger as well. 
The wrongfulness of an act of a state may be precluded 
based on the provisions on force majeure, necessity, or distress.  
These doctrines have, among other places been addressed in 
detail by the International Law Commission’s Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong Acts (“ILC 
 
123.  KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 506 (emphasis added).  
124.  DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 27.  
125.  KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 453 (emphasis added).  
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Articles”).126  The extent to which these provisions may apply to 
weather-related losses, and whether such losses can be 
attributed to the action or inaction of a nation state, will be 
analyzed next. 
 
1. Force Majeure 
 
Article 23 provides that “[t]he wrongfulness of an act of a 
State not in conformity with an international obligation of that 
State is precluded if the act is due to force majeure, that is the 
occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, 
beyond the control of the State, making it materially 
impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.”127  
Force majeure does not apply if the situation is “due, either 
alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of the 
State invoking it[;] or [if] the state has assumed the risk of that 
situation occurring.”128 
International tribunals have accepted force majeure, which 
is also recognized in the majority of the legal systems around 
the world.129  It is a general principle of international law that 
applies to a wide range of situations where a nation state has 
been “compelled to act in a manner not in conformity with the 
requirements of an international obligation incumbent upon it” 
because of a superseding event.130  Such an event could be 
extreme weather that diverts state aircraft or ships into the 
territory of another state or, problems caused by earthquakes, 
floods, or drought.  “[A] tsunami could damage a nuclear 
[power] plant, rendering it impossible for the state to comply 
with an international obligation to . . . provide energy to a 
neighbouring state.”131  Force majeure might also stem from 
human intervention such as the loss of control of a portion of a 
 
126.  Articles 23 and 25 may also apply to situations of treaty 
withdrawal.  However, this is outside the scope of this article. 
127.  DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 23.  
128.  Id. 
129.  Paddeu, supra note 10, at 476. 
130.  U.N. Legislative Series, Materials on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 23, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/25 (2012) 
[hereinafter Legislative Series].  
131.  Paddeu, supra note 10, at 463. 
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state’s territory as a result of insurrections or the destruction 
of territory by a third state.132  The doctrine of force majeure 
has traditionally been invoked in cases where ships and 
aircraft were forced into the territory of other nations because 
of severe weather.133  The same may, of course, happen in the 
future.  Drones would fall under the doctrines as well, as might 
persons (civilians or military personnel) allegedly “forced” to 
cross boundaries to, for example, obtain water in cases of 
severe drought.  As air streams and water currents may shift 
in yet unpredictable ways, pollutants may also enter the 
territory of other nations in currently unexpected ways. 
The following elements must be satisfied for the defense to 
be available: First, the act “must be brought about by an 
irresistible or unforeseen event.”134  “Irresistible” means that 
“there must be a constraint which the State was unable to 
avoid or oppose by its own means.”135  In other words, there can 
be no element of free choice that could be exercised by the 
nation.  “Unforeseen” requires that the event was neither 
actually foreseen nor of “an easily foreseeable kind.”136  Second, 
the event must have been “beyond the control” of the state.137  
Thus, the doctrine does not apply if the situation has been 
“brought about by the [state’s own conduct] . . . even if the 
resulting injury itself was accidental and unintended.”138  “A 
State may not invoke force majeure if it has caused or induced 
the situation in question.”139  In other words, the situation 
must not be “due, either alone or in combination with other 
factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it.”140  However, if 
the state has merely “contributed” to the situation, the defense 
may still be available under the circumstances of the case.141  
In that respect, a good faith standard applies to the analysis of 
the degree to which the state “caused” or “contributed to” the 
 
132.  Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 23.  
133.  Id. at art. 24.   
134.  Id. at art. 23.  
135.  Id.   
136.  Id. 
137.  Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 23.  
138.  Id.  
139.  Id.  
140.  Id. (emphasis added).  
141.  Id. 
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problem.142  Third, the event must have made compliance with 
the international obligation “materially impossible” to perform 
the obligation.143  In the Rainbow Warrior Arbitration, for 
example, France claimed that the urgent repatriation to 
France, without the consent of New Zealand, of a member of 
the French Secret Service who had placed explosives on the 
Rainbow Warrior because of an alleged medical emergency 
amounted to an absolute and material impossibility, thus 
warranting the excuse of force majeure.144  The tribunal 
disagreed.145 
Crucially, in the climate change context, the successful 
invocation of force majeure will require more than a situation 
having become more difficult in general.146 Mere economic 
difficulties or political problems also will not suffice.147  On the 
other hand, “the degree of difficulty associated with force 
majeure . . . , though considerable, is less than is required” 
under other articles that relate to “impossibility,” such as 
Article 61, governing the right to withdraw from a treaty.148  In 
practice, the defense has failed on this prong in many of the 
cases in which it has been invoked.149  Force majeure will also 
not excuse a performance “if the State has undertaken to 
prevent the particular situation arising or has otherwise 
assumed that risk.”150 
In the early cases, the doctrine was analyzed in cases of 
property damage caused by the outbreak of wars, insurrection 
and civil unrest, and pillaging by tribes.151  Only occasionally 
did the defense prevail.  In one weather-related case, the 
Venezuelan government and a French company concluded a 
 
142.  Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 23.   
143.  Id. 
144.  See U.N. Secretary-General, Ruling on the Rainbow Warrior Affair 
Between France and New Zealand, 26 I.L.M.1346 (1987). 
145.  Id. 
146.  See generally Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 23.   
147.  Id.   
148.  Id.  
149.  Id. (“In practice, many of the cases where ‘impossibility’ has been 
relied upon have not involved actual impossibility as distinct from increased 
difficulty of performance and the plea of force majeure has accordingly 
failed.”). 
150.  Id.  
151.  Paddeu, supra note 10, at 410-11, 414, 419, 420-21. 
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contract for the construction of a railway.152  The work was 
interrupted by floods, inundations, fires, earthquakes and the 
Crespo revolution.153  The French company suspended its 
operations and claimed damages for the problems caused by 
the natural events and the war.154  Both parties invoked force 
majeure: the company “claimed that it had suspended its 
operations due to force majeure brought about by the revolution 
and the government’s failure to pay” for its debts to the 
company.155  The government claimed not to be responsible for 
damages caused to the company’s assets because of the natural 
events and accidents caused by open fire.156  It also sought to 
avoid liability for its debts to the company because of the 
war.157  The umpire upheld the Venezuelan government’s plea 
of force majeure in relation to the war activities and further 
held that the government was not responsible for the 
suspension of the company’s operations because the situation 
in the country was part of those “misfortunes” which were 
“incident to government, to business, and to human life.”158  
However, tribunals may very well look differently at weather 
situations today.  With the availability of scientific knowledge 
about what causes weather events, where they will occur, and 
the expected degree of severity, nation states may be unlikely 
to attribute problems they have arguably caused to mere 
misfortunes of life. 
More recently, other considerations also highly relevant to 
climate change problems have been addressed and reconfirmed 
as follows: “Force majeure is ‘generally invoked to justify 
involuntary, or at least unintentional conduct.’”159  The 
“unforeseen external event [must be one] against which [the 
 
152.  French Company of Venezuelan Railroads, 10 R.I.A.A. 285, 335 
(1905). 
153.  Id. at 335-38.  
154.  Id. at 291, 316. 
155.  Id. at 287. 
156.  Id. at 330-31. 
157.  French Company, supra note 152, at 297, 331-32. 
158.  Id. at 353. 
159.  Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 23 (citing case between 
New Zealand and France concerning the interpretation or application of two 
agreements concluded on July 9, 1986, between the two States relating to the 
problems arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair, arbitral award, 30 April 
1990, para. 77, reproduced in UNRIAA, vol. XX, pp 252–253). 
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nation] has no remedy. . . .”160  A strict meaning is attached to 
this requirement: The constraint must be one “which the State 
was unable to avoid or to oppose by its own means . . . The 
event must be an act which occurs and produces its effect 
without the State being able to do anything which might rectify 
the event or might avert its consequences.”161 
Does it still follow legally for a nation state to assert force 
majeure in defense of such unauthorized entries because of 
“extreme” weather?  As with the doctrines of good faith and 
risk assumption, it is becoming more and more implausible for 
at least the historically largest CO2 emitters to continue to 
argue that they should, in good faith, be exempt from liability 
for the severe problems that are now arising because of historic 
(and current) greenhouse gas emissions.  The largest emitters 
must be said to have assumed that the problem would arise.  
To a large extent, they postponed action that could have 
remedied some of the worst climatic effects that we are now 
beginning to witness.  Of course, this stems from a lack of 
political will to take such action, but under the law, mere 
political difficulties do not warrant a finding of non-liability 
under the excuse of force majeure. 
Further, it makes less and less common sense to claim that 
allegedly extreme or severe weather events causing aircraft, 
vessels or even people to enter the territory of another state 
without prior consent should be excused because such weather 
was not actually foreseen or of an easily foreseeable kind.  
Common sense does and should continue to drive the 
development of the law as well.  With today’s readily available 
knowledge about climate change, arguments that almost any 
kind of weather-related event that could correctly have been 
considered extreme and unforeseeable in the past are becoming 
increasingly implausible.  “Extreme weather is rapidly 
becoming the new norm [around the globe].”162  What were 
previously seen as actually unforeseen, if not altogether 
unforeseeable, events are now typically the exact opposite: 
 
160.  Id. at art. 23.  
161.  Id. 
162.  Mid-Atlantic Transition Hub, MATH Builds Mid-Atlantic Extreme 
Weather Resilience, TRANSITION U.S., http://transitionus.org/stories/math-
builds-mid-atlantic-extreme-weather-resilience (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).  
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highly foreseeable regarding the frequency, location, time of 
year, and degree of severity.  They should thus be foreseen as 
well.  Nation states, as well as private actors, must become 
more practically and legally prepared for severe weather posing 
more and more problems of increasing severity as experience 
has already amply demonstrated by now.  The law should come 
to reflect this new reality in both the private and public 
spheres. 
The legal difficulty remains, however, whether the problem 
can, narrowly, be said to be due to the actions or inactions of 
certain nations or whether these have merely contributed to 
the problem, in which case the defenses may still be available.  
Clearly, some nations have contributed significantly to the 
substantive problem because of decades of regulatory inaction 
and, in the case of some, downright denial of responsibility for 
the underlying problem, if not even the very existence of the 
problem itself.  For the defense to lie, the situation must thus 
not be due singly or in combination with other factors to the 
invoking state.  Some nations persistently rely on the 
argument that they could not, by their own means, have 
stemmed the problem.  Thus, they will argue, they have not 
been able to (and are still not able to) “control” the problem and 
did not “cause” it; they merely “contributed” to an already 
existing problem.  In that case, the doctrine might still be 
applicable.  In other words, the force majeure doctrine requires 
a close causal examination of the extent to which other factors 
contributed to the problem than the actions of one particular 
nation state.  A multitude of nations and actors caused climate 
change, but notably, the defense may be denied even where 
other nations have also not taken sufficient regulatory or other 
action.  Unilaterality is thus neither a requirement nor a 
defense. 
Case law also demonstrates that for the defense of force 
majeure to lie, the invoking state must not have been able to do 
“anything” which “might” rectify the problem or avert its 
consequences.163  Mere financial or political difficulties are, as 
explained, not enough to warrant the excuse.  In the case of 
climate change, many developed nations now take active steps 
 
163.  Paddeu, supra note 10, at 457. 
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to prevent dangerous climate change.  Some nations are willing 
to step up their efforts even more in the future.  For example, 
Denmark’s CO2 emissions have already dropped 22% since 
1990.164  The EU’s key climate action targets are 20% 
greenhouse gas emission reductions by 2020,165 40% by 2030, 
and 80-95% by 2050.166  The United States and China have, 
finally, also agreed to undertake action against climate change 
as have, arguably, all nations under the Paris Agreement.  To 
some extent, it still remains to be seen if the parties also take 
effective steps to live up to the promises.  But it remains clear 
that nation states can - if the will is there - now take practical, 
regulatory, financial and other steps to solve the substantive 
problem.  For that reason, too, should the availability of force 
majeure be scrutinized in relation to potential nation state 
liability for loss and damage to the territories of other nations. 
A continued reliance on the isolationist argument—since 
one particular state or even group of states cannot singularly 
curb the problem, the defenses described in this article should 
be available—is clearly undesirable from a practical and public 
policy point of view.  Climate change may soon take on even 
worse life-and-death consequences than what is already 
thought to be the case,167 not to mention the severe economic 
problems that have become traceable to climate change.  Since 
some nations are now reducing CO2 emissions significantly, 
the argument that the actions of one nation or region will not 
help are no longer warranted.  Every action taken helps and, 
perhaps more importantly, spurs even further action by other 
 
164.  Ture Falbe-Hansen, Danish Carbon Emissions Continue to Drop, 
STATE OF GREEN (May 12, 2014), https://stateofgreen.com/en/profiles/danish-
energy-agency/news/danish-carbon-emissions-continue-to-drop. 
165.  European Commission, 2020 climate & energy package, CLIMATE 
ACTION, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020_en (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2017).  
166.  European Commission, 2050 low-carbon economy, CLIMATE ACTION, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2050_en#tab-0-0 (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2017). 
167.  The intense 2003 heat waves in Europe were blamed for more than 
70,000 deaths.  Wynne Parry, Recent Heat Waves Likely Warmest Since 1500 
in Europe, LIVE SCIENCE (Mar. 17, 2011, 2:02 PM), 
http://www.livescience.com/13296-european-russia-heat-waves-climate-
change.html. 
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nations.168  The argument often raised by some nations in 
defense of a general unwillingness to adopt climate change 
regulations because of other nations’ alleged unwillingness to 
do the same has become unjustifiable in light of the now 
increasing action taken by at least some developed nations and 
regions, such as the EU.  With the availability of knowledge 
demonstrating the severe consequences of climate change and 
the financial and many other advantages of taking action 
sooner rather than later, the international finger-pointing and 
responsibility avoidance must stop.  This is a serious situation 
and can no longer be treated as a race to the bottom at the 
national or international governance levels. 
Although extreme weather events have, of course, always 
caused problems for humankind, with today’s knowledge of the 
causes and effects of climate change, it is, in short, becoming 
geopolitically unethical and logically unwarranted to continue 
to allow nations to prevail on the argument that they were 
neither in control of nor able to stem the problem.  They were 
precisely able to take regulatory or other action against this 
very well documented problem of significant international 
economic and humanitarian effect, but, in the case of many, 
failed to do so.  The more they continue to postpone effective 
action, the less they should be able to use the excuse doctrines 
analyzed in this article. 
Force majeure may be denied where, as in private law, 
parties assumed the risk of the problem occurring.  Nation 
states very arguably assume the risk of severe weather-related 
problems via their continued political unwillingness to address 
the issue sufficiently, effectively, and quickly at the national 
levels.  Somebody must blink first. Some nations and regions 
have.  Others should now follow.  The required “absolute and 
immaterial impossibility” required for the defense to lie is 
simply no longer present when parties are currently - or should 
be - well aware of what action they can take to stem the 
problem.  Again, mere political unwillingness to do so does not 
warrant a finding that the defense may lie. 
Finally, a good faith standard applies to the issue of force 
 
168.  See generally Myanna Dellinger, Narrowed Constellations in a 
Supranational Climate Change Regime Complex: The “Magic Number” is 
Three, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 373 (2014). 
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majeure.  Some nations may have difficulty prevailing on a 
good-faith argument that the problem is not due to their 
actions.  This is simply implausible in relation to at least the 
major historical CO2 emitters.  Granted, clarity of the 
causation issue through elaboration of the relevant doctrinal 
phraseology or case precedent would now be helpful in the 
context of climate change.  Under international force majeure 
law, nation states quite simply ought no longer be able to rely 
on the argument that they have not contributed to the problem.  
Again, it is time for this finger-pointing to stop. 
The climate change situation is brought about by the 
regulatory neglect of some nations.  However, neglect may also 
work to disqualify nations from successfully using the defense 
of force majeure.  Notably, even where the resulting injury may 
be argued to be “accidental and unintended,” the defense will 
still not succeed if neglect or affirmative action by the nation 
state has contributed to the problem in the first place.169  This 
is indeed the case in relation to many of the major current and 
historical CO2 emitters. 
The global climate is rapidly altered by the continued 
heavy use of fossil fuels and the continuance of problematic 
infrastructure patterns, among many other things.  Although 
customary international law has long recognized the right of a 
state to exploit and use natural resources within its territory 
and poses few, if any, limits to how a nation state may chose to 
build its internal infrastructure, some limits are nonetheless 
imposed internationally on the related rights and duties when 
such exploitation patterns cause transboundary harm to the 
territory of another state, at least under theories described 
above.  In practice, not many cases have yet analyzed and 
emphasized this point, but with the losses that are likely to be 
attributable to climate change, this situation may very well 
change in the near future. 
 
  
 
169.  Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 23.  
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2. Necessity 
 
Article 25 of the United Nations Legislative Series 
Materials on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrong Acts provides that: 
 
Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a 
ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act 
not in conformity with an international 
obligation of that State unless the act: (a) is the 
only way for the State to safeguard an essential 
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and 
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest 
of the State or States towards which the 
obligation exists, or of the international 
community as a whole.170 
 
In similarity with Article 23 on force majeure, necessity 
may not be invoked if the State has contributed to the situation 
of necessity.171  In contrast to Article 23, however, Article 25 
allows for an element of voluntariness in the choice of actions 
and thus conduct that may be “deliberate, voluntary, not 
involuntary, [or] intentional” whereas force majeure involves 
conduct that is involuntary or coerced.172 
It is important to note that the definition of necessity is 
read very narrowly and presupposes an absolute impossibility 
of taking other course of action than that which led to the 
violation of an international obligation.  Necessity may excuse 
the wrongful act, but a state may still be obliged to make 
compensation. 
In contrast to force majeure, necessity does not depend on 
the prior conduct of the state and “does not involve conduct 
which is involuntary or coerced.”173  The situation of necessity 
 
170. Id. at art. 25 (emphasis added). 
171. Id. 
172. Paddeu, supra note 10, at 466 (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
173. Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 25.  
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“may be caused by the ‘foreseeable but unavoidable 
consequences of facts which have long been present.’”174  The 
same underlying events could give rise to both the defense of 
necessity and force majeure.  For example, a tsunami making it 
impossible for a nation state to deliver electricity to another as 
mentioned above may also damage cultivated land, thus 
creating a food emergency for the population of a state causing 
it to disregard its antecedent international obligations to 
provide food for another state out of necessity.175  Necessity 
relates to future action, whereas force majeure relates to 
current action.  Necessity must be established from an 
objective point of view, although some measure of uncertainty 
will not preclude use of the plea as long as the state can prove, 
with some degree of uncertainty, that the threat of harm is not 
merely apprehended or contingent.176  For example, in one case, 
the completion of a system of water locks was considered to 
result in future environmental harm.177  This harm allegedly 
required prophylactic action.  The state in question could not, 
however, prove to any degree of certainty that ecological harm 
would in fact occur; although the Court rejected the plea on the 
facts, it upheld the principle of ecological necessity in 
protecting the environment as an “essential interest of the 
state.”178  Environmental concerns thus clearly form part of the 
doctrine. 
The requirement that the action taken must be the “only 
way” to safeguard the essential interest at stake does not 
require the action to be unilateral.  In fact, the action may also 
“comprise other forms of conduct available through cooperative 
action with other States or through international 
organizations.”179  Good faith in such cooperation is, of course, 
to be expected from the global governance community.  The 
concept is elusive, but might not be stretched so far as to result 
in the imposition of financial liability on nation states with a 
 
174.  Paddeu, supra note 10, at 462 (citing Ago, Eighth Report – Add. 5-
7, 14 (para. 2)). 
175.  Id. at 463. 
176.  Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. 
Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 42 (Sept. 25, 1997). 
177.  Paddeu, supra note 10, at 465. 
178.  Id. 
179.  Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 25.  
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current or historical great impact on climate change. 
Necessity is, in short, used to “denote those exceptional 
cases where the only way a State can safeguard an essential 
interest threatened by a grave and imminent peril is . . . not to 
perform some other international obligation of lesser weight or 
urgency.”180  It governs situations of grave danger to the 
essential interests of the nation state itself or to the 
international community as a whole.181  The doctrine forms 
part of customary international law. 
Case law demonstrates the ways in which the doctrine 
could find relevance in today’s environmentally and resource-
stressed world.  Recall that the extent of the necessity must be 
“imminent and urgent,”182 which is the case with the level of 
species extinction currently looming on the horizon.  In the 
“Russian Fur Seals controversy of 1893, . . .” [Russia argued 
that] the ‘essential interest’ to be safeguarded against a ‘grave 
and imminent peril’ was the natural environment” and the 
extinction of a species considered necessary for economic 
reasons.183  Russia “issued a decree prohibiting sealing in an 
area of the high seas” that was not subject to the jurisdiction of 
any state or international regulation citing to the essential 
precautionary character of the measures.184  Similarly, where 
regulatory measures were considered ineffective to conserve 
straddling stocks of Greenland halibut threatened with 
extinction, Canada arrested a Spanish fishing ship on the basis 
of necessity.185  In yet another case, the British government 
bombed a shipwrecked Liberian oil tanker to protect the 
English coastline.186  The British government did not advance 
any other legal theory for its conduct other than necessity.187  
No international protest resulted.188 
 
180.  Id. 
181.  Id. 
182.  2 LORD MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 232 (1956). 
183.  DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 25.  
184.  Id. 
185.  Case Concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Judgment, 
1998 I.C.J. 432, at 54 (Dec. 4, 1998).  
186.  See generally Albert E. Utton, Protective Measures and the “Torrey 
Canyon”, 9 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1968).   
187.  Id. 
188.  Id. 
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Species extinction concerns are also of modern relevance 
given the current threat of mass extinction of species.  Climate 
change will affect the survivability of species.  Further, as food 
and shortages crises are recognized to have the potential to 
lead to not only broad human and animal survival problems, 
but perhaps even civil unrest or international armed conflict, 
necessity may be argued in defense of action to protect a 
nation’s food or water supplies.  This has already been done, 
although to a smaller scale than what may be the case in the 
future.  In one dispute, for example, “the Portuguese 
government argued that the pressing necessity of providing for 
the subsistence of certain contingents of troops engaged in 
quelling internal disturbances justified its appropriation of 
property owned by British subjects . . . .”189 
In short, necessity has been invoked to protect “a wide 
variety of interests, including safeguarding the environment, 
preserving the very existence of the State and its people in time 
of public emergency, or ensuring the safety of a civilian 
population.”190 The relevance to climate change and natural 
resource shortages as an excuse doctrine is obvious.  The lack 
of regulatory action may, however, be seen as the “conduct” 
that will preclude a nation state from arguing force majeure in 
the extreme weather context.  Other regions or nations may, by 
way of contrast, seek to exceed the regulatory limits 
established by such bodies as the WTO and the EU or under 
international conventions for habitat- or species-protective 
reasons.  If unilateral prohibitions on conduct otherwise 
allowed under international law were to be instigated, as was 
the case in the Russian Fur seal case, economic necessity may, 
arguably, once again be raised in defense of taking such 
prohibitory action.  This argument arguably has even more 
relevance today than before.  As cases have also demonstrated, 
one nation may avoid international repercussions for the arrest 
of other nations’ persons or vessels where such action can be 
successfully argued to be the “only way” for a state to protect 
imminently endangered species.  As species such as certain 
large cats, polar bears, rhinos and elephants are now at the 
 
189.  DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 25.  See also MCNAIR, supra note 
182, at 232. 
190.  Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 25.  
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brink of extinction, nations might, for example, arrest persons 
on the territory of other nations in alleged last-ditch effort to 
save the species.  Where such action violates international law, 
the nation(s) at issue may well be able to raise the defense of 
necessity successfully now as has been done in the past. 
On the human front, research has already demonstrated 
the problems that may be caused by future mass migrations of 
people because of droughts, unrest, and even potential wars 
caused by climate issues (the “climate refugee” problem).  Some 
nations may seek to reject large amounts of climate refugees, 
citing to their own lack of resources and other economic issues.  
Whether current or future human rights and other legal 
obligations sufficiently cover this issue is beyond the scope of 
this analysis.  However, it is established international 
necessity law that a nation may take measures “for the 
protection of its own essential security interests.”191 As the 
climate change problem worsens into a situation posing greater 
and greater risks of national, as well as international, security 
issues, necessity may well be argued successfully in attempts to 
limit migrants from entering another nation’s territory where 
the rejecting nation can point to its own grave and imminent 
problems.  As has often been mentioned in this context, few 
nations are likely to be willing to host all the refugees from, for 
example, Bangladesh, suffering from vast flooding problems.  
Nations are unlikely to raise or, of course, succeed on an 
argument that they are simply not willing to host such climate 
refugees, but if they can cite to their own objective inability to 
do so, the matter changes legally under the defenses analyzed 
here. 
Climate geo-engineering has also recently gained much 
theoretical, if not yet much practical, traction as a potential, 
albeit risky, “Band-Aid” solution to climate change until more 
viable and less risky solutions are identified.  Many legal 
challenges surface in this context.  An important one of these is 
who, if anyone, can and should regulate potential geo-
engineering implementation activities.  So far, no international 
regulatory framework is directly on point.  A rogue nation or 
even private actors may, in the not too distant future, decide to 
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implement some of the most “promising” technologies, such as 
solar radiation management to protect the local climate (e.g. 
more shade and rain in a given region) or to test the applicable 
engineering theories.  If accused of violating any potentially 
applicable laws by or harming other nations that see those 
activities as threats and not potential solutions to the 
temperature increase problem, a nation might assert necessity 
in defense.  The same considerations mentioned above would 
apply.  The international community should timely prepare 
itself legally for the likelihood that geo-engineering activities 
may soon be implemented by private actors or nations no 
longer able to, for example, grow sufficient crops or provide its 
population with sufficient water because of rising 
temperatures.  That preparation includes considering risk and 
the doctrines mentioned in this article. 
As with the doctrine of force majeure, the foreseeability 
element and good faith standard apply, but can arguably not be 
satisfied by nation states who now, for quite some time, have 
known about the dire consequences of climate change, yet are 
only now beginning to take some action – arguably not even 
enough – to mitigate the problem.  Nation states who have 
contributed significantly to a certain problem should not at the 
same time be able to invoke the defense of necessity.  Most 
developed nations have indeed contributed significantly to the 
problem in a manner for which responsibility is allocable, given 
legal and political will to do so, by examining the historical 
contributions and assigning liability on a relative basis. 
Importantly, the doctrine cannot be invoked if it impairs 
an essential interest of the international legal community in 
general or a smaller number of other nations in particular.  
That is clearly the case with climate change.  Nations that 
have both contributed significantly to the problem, yet at the 
same time seek to avoid financial responsibility for the now-
apparent consequences, thereof ought not be able to invoke the 
doctrine of necessity.  This is so because they precisely place 
other nations, and indeed the entire global community, at 
grave risk of financial and indeed human, animal, and plant 
viability outfalls if they continue to not take sufficient and 
sufficiently urgent action against climate change.  The latter is 
arguably still the case despite some dawn on the horizon in the 
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form of the Paris Agreement and some national and 
subnational action. 
Conversely, nations may well be entitled to use the 
doctrine of necessity where they take action to protect species 
or human populations from grave peril, such as death or, in the 
case of animals, species extinction.  For example, nations may 
seek to protect supplies of food and water supplies in cross-
boundary situations as these resources become increasingly 
scarce in a rapidly warming world.  If one water-importing 
nation invaded another to ensure continued water supplies 
from the exporting nation, the importing nation could arguably 
assert the defense of necessity.  Similarly, and as 
demonstrated, nations have been excused from the 
wrongfulness of their acts where they undertook such acts 
against other nations in order to protect species, even for 
financial reasons.  They may arguably do so again as we are, as 
a global community, already facing a sixth mass extinction that 
is exacerbated by climate change.  Necessity may well be found 
to lie in such cases. 
Taking cross-border action to, for example, obtain 
resources in times of urgency may appear problematic, enough 
even if only of a temporary nature, but worse yet, the steps 
that may be taken by increasingly desperate nations in a more 
and more distressed natural environment may not end if 
resources were to be obtained in the short run.  Imagine the 
following: a region or nation becomes so frustrated with 
another nation not taking effective action against the long-term 
ecological problems caused by coal-fired power plants that the 
frustrated nation sends drones into the recalcitrant nation to 
destroy some or all such power plants in that nation.  This is 
clearly a violation of international law.  The infringing nation 
argues ecological necessity asserting that action had to be 
taken, even though it admits it is not entirely certain that the 
action taken will ultimately stem the underlying problem at 
issue (climate change).  Recall that such arguments have been 
raised successfully in much less controversial cases even 
though actors in those cases were also not certain that the 
harm complained of would, in fact, occur.  In contrast, with 
today’s knowledge of climate change, government entities, as 
well as private actors, do know that ecological harm will arise 
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from a continued heavy use of fossil fuels.  Protection of the 
environment is an established legal objective and mandate in 
many arenas.  When it comes to the defenses analyzed in this 
article, environmental protection has been held to be an 
essential interest of the state.  Nations may prevail on defenses 
in this context even in what may currently be seen as an 
extreme and provocative instance of action against the property 
of another state.  Recall that no international complaints were 
raised when Britain destroyed a Liberian oil tanker in order to, 
precisely, protect the environment.  Case precedent does allow 
for some unilateral action without antecedent consent as long 
as, of course, the other doctrinal elements set forth above are 
met. 
The question also arises whether nations may rely 
defensively on the doctrine of necessity in actively seeking to 
stem the underlying problem of climate change.  For example, 
if one nation invaded another to forcibly stop the production of 
energy from coal- or oil-fired power plants, may the invading 
nation excuse itself because of necessity?  As demonstrated, 
precautionary ecological interests are clearly covered by the 
doctrine.  To protect not only animal species, as have been done 
in the past, but also human populations as well as food and 
water supplies, it is not unthinkable that one nation state may 
raise this argument in this manner in the future.  For example, 
consider the current extreme drought in the American 
Southwest and Northern Mexico affecting both United States 
and Mexico agriculture and water supplies.  The Colorado 
River is running lower and lower, causing problems for farmers 
in Mexico and the United States alike.  Could Mexico claim 
necessity in entering U.S. territory to extract water from the 
upstream portions of the river where water may still be 
available?  Looking north, could a future, even further parched, 
USA enter Canada for urgent water needs to avoid human 
deaths?  Conversely, if Mexico continues to build more coal-
fired power plants, could a future U.S. government more keenly 
interested in curbing climate change than what has been the 
case so far enter Mexico to physically prevent the construction 
of such facilities or to demolish existing ones relying on 
necessity, seeking to protect scarce water resources in the 
American Southwest that are imperiled by climate change?  In 
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the water examples, certainly an “essential interest” as well as 
a grave and imminent peril are involved if water is not 
available for drinking purposes.  Recall that the subsistence of 
contingencies of troops has been invoked as grounds for 
necessity.  Where the very survival of a nation’s population 
may be at stake for lack of water, or even food, it is not 
unthinkable that a nation state might seek and become 
excused from international liability for such urgent action out 
of necessity in the future.  Existing case law supports this, as 
demonstrated above.  Of course, this would seem to require 
that the nation seeking to invoke the necessity doctrine “comes 
to the law with clean hands” and thus does not continue to 
contribute to climate change in as major ways as is currently 
the case with, for example, the United States in the above 
example. 
 
3. Distress 
 
Finally, Article 24 may be invoked as a defense to the 
international wrongfulness of an act of state; however, this 
doctrine only applies in the very limited circumstances where 
human life is at immediate risk.192  The doctrine applies in: 
 
the specific case where an individual whose acts 
are attributable to the State is in a situation of 
peril, either personally or in relation to persons 
under his or her care.  The article precludes the 
wrongfulness of conduct . . . in circumstances 
where the agent had no other reasonable way of 
saving life.193 
 
As with Articles 23 and 25, an excuse under Article 24 is 
not available if “the situation of distress is due, either alone or 
in combination with other factors, to the conduct of the State 
invoking it.”194  “In practice, cases of distress have mostly 
involved aircraft or ships entering State territory under stress 
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of weather or following mechanical or navigational failure” in 
order to save the life of passengers.195 
This doctrine may become relevant in the climate context.  
Could the doctrine, for example, be invoked by public utility 
leaders in parts or all of nations urgently needing water or 
energy for air-conditioning during extreme heat spells to save 
citizens in the affected regions if such leaders physically 
retrieved, without prior permission, resources that may not be 
available in the agent’s own nation from another nation?  For 
example, the summers of 2003 and 2013 saw extreme heat 
waves and numerous resulting deaths in large portions of 
Southern Europe196 where nations have traditionally had both 
sufficient water as well as electricity for air-conditioning (even 
though people in that part of the world have not historically 
relied much on air-conditioning).  As summer temperatures in 
Southern Europe and coastal parts of the Middle East are now 
often in the very high 30s to low 40s Celsius (105-107 degrees 
Fahrenheit) or more in summer,197 could leaders of power 
providers in affected nations such as Syria forcibly tap into 
energy lines in neighboring Turkey, or Albania into those in 
Greece, for electricity using the defense of necessity?  Would 
economically hard-hit Greece be able to rely on the doctrine of 
distress or necessity to take resources from neighboring or 
nearby nations for urgent relief reasons without prior 
permission?  Italy, for example, is arguably not much better off 
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than Greece economically.  Could it, under any of these 
defenses, withdraw resources from much wealthier neighboring 
Switzerland?  Southwestern Europe is not often thought of as a 
hotbed for international strife because of the lack of natural 
resources or electricity, but as resources of various kinds are 
becoming more and more scarce, what has so far been 
considered a given in international relations – for example, 
that no highly severe energy or resource conflicts would arise 
in at least Western Europe – may well become a legally 
challenging issue in the not too distant future in a world with 
rapidly rising temperatures and the resulting practical, 
economic and legal changes.  The diplomatic and pragmatic 
solutions of yesteryear may simply not suffice in the future. 
It is then that the above excuses may see a renewed 
importance for which the international legal community should 
be prepared.  Importantly, however, even though the pure legal 
wrongfulness of an act is precluded, a perpetrating nation state 
may, as analyzed above, still be held responsible for the loss 
caused to another nation.198  As climate change continues to 
intensify, the issue of loss, damage, and liability is likely to 
become much more legally prevalent in the near future. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Climate change poses a severe risk of financial and 
economic problems for individuals, companies, and nation 
states around the world.  As the negotiations and conclusion of 
the Paris climate change agreement show, developed nations 
are unwilling to accept legal liability for loss and damage 
caused by climate change.  Provisions of other international 
law could, however,, nonetheless result in a finding that 
nations causing such damage to other nations are financially 
liable, even if the nation state causing the problem did not act 
in internationally wrongful ways if prevailing under one of the 
excuse doctrines as analyzed above. 
A solution under customary international law as analyzed 
in this article may not be the most obvious or, granted, even 
the best way of apportioning financial liability for the injuries 
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that we know are likely to arise because of climate change.  
Lawsuits are always risky and unpredictable.  This is even 
more so on somewhat uncertain legal grounds such as the ones 
analyzed here.  It would be better if the world community 
would have simply accepted the risks and, under the UNFCCC, 
agreed to shoulder the burden equitably and proportionally.  
That currently does not seem to be the case.  Similarly, the 
international legal climate framework should come to include 
definitions and rights of climate refugees.  Microfunding for 
particularly vulnerable areas should become feasible, as should 
better risk insurance programs.  But these things are not yet 
politically feasible, so until this becomes the case, all options 
for financial burden-sharing should remain on the table. 
One of the current major problems of establishing liability 
for climate change is the perception that “it is impossible to 
draw a causal connection between one state[‘s] emissions and a 
[particular] natural disaster that leads” to damage.199  This 
difficulty has said to make the liability approach untenable.200  
Instead: 
 
[A] shared-responsibility approach to climate 
[change] policy . . . would call upon the 
international community to assist in the 
realization of economic, social, and cultural 
rights not only for all victims of climate harm, 
but for all people worldwide . . . States would be 
expected to help protect and restore rights 
through climate adaptation not on the basis of 
their contribution to climate change, but on the 
basis of universally shared “obligations to fulfill 
human rights for all.”201 
 
That is a very laudable idea, but as analyzed above, 
nations states are continuing rather than reversing their long 
history of shirking financial and practical responsibility for 
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climate change.  Developed nations are simply not currently 
willing to voluntarily undertake the financial responsibility of 
their historic and ongoing carbon dioxide emissions.  One can 
hope that they will realize the fairness in doing so, but neither 
does history show this to be the case nor is there little realistic 
hope that this situation will change any time soon.  In the 
meantime, it is proving more and more likely that many 
victims – nation states and individuals – will “go 
uncompensated and suffer.”202 
Human rights law is not more helpful.  In the past, human 
rights law has seldom been used to promote a particular 
distribution of burdens to achieve a rights objective that could 
also find use in the climate change context with today’s 
knowledge of the implications caused by so-called “extreme” 
weather.  “International obligations to assist developing states 
in fulfilling economic, social, and cultural rights are[,] [for 
example,] left very vague in the [International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural rights].”203  In fact, the Covenant 
only requires states to provide “international assistance and 
cooperation” to achieve the realization of rights.204  “Because 
the Covenant does not specify a minimum level of foreign 
assistance”205 and because nation states are likely to look at 
this as a non-binding mandate anyway, “human rights law has 
not been read as establishing specific obligations for the 
international community.  Even making good on the oft-
reiterated promise by OECD countries to give 0.7% of GNI as 
official development assistance has rarely been described as a 
duty under human rights law.”206  Thus, returning to 
traditional liability for damage caused to another nation as in, 
for example, the Trail Smelter case, may currently be the most 
viable option that nations have for obtaining financial 
assistance in relation to damage caused by other nations’ 
historical and continued contributions to and exacerbation of 
climate change. 
Although treaty adoption, adherence and exit 
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considerations are beyond the scope of this article, one 
important aspect should, however, be addressed because of its 
clear relevance to the analyses in this article, namely the 
UNFCCC.  “The ultimate objective of this treaty is to achieve 
the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’”207  The 
2015 Paris Agreement similarly seeks to limit the increase in 
the global average temperature to “well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels, and [to] pursu[e] efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” by 
2100.208 The principle pacta sunt servanda requires nation 
states to, in good faith, observe the obligations of treaties to 
which they are parties whether they are, strictly seen, legally 
binding or not.  However, nations may seek to avoid even such 
treaty goals without, arguably, having to face repercussions 
from the international legal community under the necessity 
and force majeure defenses.  This is so because Articles 23 and 
25 also apply to situations of treaty withdrawal.  But notably, 
“force majeure [will] not excuse [a] performance if the State has 
undertaken to prevent the particular situation . . . or has 
otherwise assumed the risk.”209  This is precisely the case 
under the UNFCCC umbrella.  For that reason, the nations 
that are party to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement may 
indeed not be able to invoke force majeure in relation to a 
possible future claim that the nation states simply cannot live 
up to the treaty obligations and thus should be allowed to 
withdraw from a treaty without following normal procedures 
for doing so.  The current great amount of inaction in solving 
the substantive problem of climate change is, in fact, assuming 
the known risks of climate change. 
Further, the requirement that there be “no other way” to 
solve an imminent and grave problem than by taking certain 
action otherwise prohibited under international law may 
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encompass an obligation to cooperate with other states or 
international organizations.  In few international legal contexts 
has this requirement been as blatantly disregarded by some 
nations such as the United States and Australia as in relation 
to climate change action.  Thus, if it came to certain 
recalcitrant nations such as these attempting to invoke the 
above defenses under international law, question marks could 
and should correctly be raised in response to such arguments 
as they related to extreme weather and climate change. 
In sum, all three defenses analyzed above rely on a level of 
nation state “innocence” and inability to prevent what was 
previously seen as “extreme” weather events that is currently 
no longer warranted, given modern scientific knowledge about 
the causes and effects of climate change.  Several nation states 
have, for a very long time, contributed actively, knowingly and 
significantly to the underlying pollution problem.  Several 
nations displayed neglectful, if not outright reckless, behavior 
in this context.  Granted, it has been and still is very difficult to 
reach an effective global political solution to the climate change 
problem.  That being said, it very arguably defies logic and 
common sense to excuse certain nations from international 
liability based on force majeure or necessity for the reasons 
mentioned above.  A hard look at these defense doctrines is 
currently warranted to ensure that they match modern reality.  
This may, however, require a geopolitical degree of willingness 
that is lacking in relation to liability for climate-related 
problems as it is in relation to effective international solutions 
to the broader issue of climate change itself.  However, 
international political reluctance should no longer be used as 
an excuse for not taking all the action that all governance 
entities in various nations can take to curb climate change.  
With the Paris Agreement and other new legal developments at 
the national and subnational levels in, for example, the United 
States and China, there is fortunately hope that some nations 
will lead the way forward in this important race.  This race 
should be one to the top, not the bottom. 
For the very significant public policy reason of seeking to 
finally bring about the required effective action against climate 
change by nations that have so far sought to avoid taking such 
action, the force majeure, necessity and distress doctrines 
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should, in potential future judicial applications, be critically 
examined before being applied in relation to the nations that 
have contributed or still contribute a large extent to the super 
wicked problem known as climate change.  For the reasons 
described in this article, such nations should not be able to 
invoke the excuse doctrines in order to obtain a holding of no 
legal wrongdoing.  Even if they are successful in so doing, they 
might be held liable for the damage caused to other nations by 
their regulatory inaction.  From one point of view, this would 
be breaking new legal ground as no such liability has yet been 
assigned at the international plane in the climate change 
context.  But from another point of view, holding nation states 
liable for damage caused to the territory of other nations 
simply harks back to the legal principles and ethical notions 
invoked as early as in the Trail Smelter case.  Ultimately, 
holding nations financially liable for action that they, with the 
availability of much modern knowledge, could and should have 
known would cause problems for others might be unpopular to 
some, but would only be fair to others.  At the end of the day, 
however, law is about fairness and equity.  Although that 
might require an involuntary redistribution of funds in the 
climate change loss and damage context, such action would 
both achieve more fairness, but also send a strong signal to 
rectify the underlying problem.  Ways of doing so have become 
possible.  More are surfacing.  It is time for nations to act in the 
right way, taking the risks posed to other nations into account. 
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